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RECENT DECISIONS
method, neither a secondary school teacher, nor a college instruc-
tor can be suspended or discharged for his choice of subject matter
or his use of a particular method without prior notice of its
proscription.
With regard to the substantive aspect of academic freedom as
applied to higher education, Mailloux is less clear. The very fact
that the court distinguished between secondary and higher educa-
tion lends support for a broader substantive freedom at the college
or university level. But the substantive freedom at the college or
university level is not without restriction. Whether, as the court
suggested, the instructor's freedom is to be limited to choosing
"among options for which there is any substantial support" 4 or
whether some other standard may be more appropriate is a ques-
tion that was beyond the scope of Mailloux, and remains unan-
swered.
BRADLEY J. KEITH
Secured Transactions: Address as a Formal Requisite of the Financ-
ing Statement-The Uniform Commercial Code adopted the no-
tice filing system, calling simply for a notice indicating that the
secured party who has filed may have a security interest.' The
document filed, however, must satisfy the information requisites of
section 9-402(1).2 But how strictly are its provisions construed?
In Burlington National Bank v. Strauss,3 the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court was asked to determine whether a purchase money
lender, Strauss, had perfected his security interest so as to enable
his interest to take priority over the bank's standard form security
24. Id. at 1391.
1. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-402, Comment 2.
2. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-402(1):
A financing statement is sufficient if it is signed by the debtor and the secured party,
gives an address of the secured party from which information concerning the security
interest may be obtained, gives a mailing address of the debtor and contains a
statement indicating the types, or describing the items, of collateral. A financing
statement may be filed before a security agreement is made or a security interest
otherwise attaches. . . .A copy of the security agreement is sufficient as a financing
statement if it contains the above information and is signed by both parties.
3. 50 Wis. 2d 270, 184 N.W.2d 122 (1971).
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agreement containing an after-acquired property clause.' The
court, in striking down Strauss' security interest, stated that the
purposes of information and notice contemplated by section 9-
402(1) of the Code were not satisfied when his name alone ap-
peared on the document. The court supported its position by citing
Strevell-Paterson Finance Co. v. May,5 wherein a filed chattel
mortgage was ruled defective as a perfected security interest be-
cause the seller's address did not appear on the instrument.
Since the purpose of section 9-402(1) is to put parties on notice
to the effect that the secured party may have a security interest in
the collateral and further inquiry from the parties concerned will
be necessary to disclose the complete state of affairs," the court's
protection in Strauss may have been misplaced when it stated: "It
is immaterial that the bank may have, in fact, known of Strauss,
his identity and residence and was not misled."' A more liberal
result obtained in Rooney v. Mason." Despite a total lack of ad-
dress on the filed security agreement, the court held the instru-
ment valid, stating that the addresses were "readily available and
known by virtually all creditors."9 In Silver v. Gulf City Body
and Trailer Works,"' an address on the financing statement ap-
peared as "Box 2146, Fort Worth, Texas." The court ruled the
address to be in substantial compliance with the Code require-
ments:
Post office boxes do not have to possess the occult quality of
engaging in oral communication with inquirers to meet the re-
quirements of the Alabama Uniform Commercial Code that a
financing statement show the address of the secured party.. To
paraphrase-the Code helps those who help themselves."
Substantial compliance was also found in In re Bennet, 2 wherein
4. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-312(4):
A purchase money security interest in collateral other than inventory has priority
over a conflicting security interest in the same collateral if the purchase money
security interest is perfected at the time the debtor receives possession of the collat-
eral or within ten days thereafter.
5. 77 N.M. 331, 422 P.2d 366 (1967).
6. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-402, Comment 2.
7. 50 Wis. 2d at 279, 184 N.W.2d at 126-27.
8. 394 F.2d 250 (10th Cir. 1968).
9. Id. at 253.
10. 432 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1970).
II. Id. at 992.
12. 6 UCC REP. SERV. 551 (W.D. Mich. 1969).
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the seller's address did not appear on the security instrument filed
and the assignment executed on the back contained an outdated
address of the seller. The court held the instrument to be effective
"because any inquiry at the old address would have been referred
to the secured party."13 While an address of the secured party as
"Coca-Cola Bottling Co., East Hartford, Conn." was held to meet
the Code requirements in In re Bengtson," an address given for a
bank as "Dallas, Texas" was considered insufficient by the Mary-
land Attorney General because there was "no telling how many
branches or divisions this bank has."'' 5
Erroneous and misspelled names have also led up to varying
constructions of section 9-402(1). A conditional sales contract was
filed with an erroneous name in In re Excel Stores, Inc." The name
appeared as "Excel Department Stores" rather than Excel Stores,
Inc., and, although the business was conducted under the same roof
as Excel Enterprises, Inc., the court concluded there was substan-
tial compliance. Emphasis was placed on the fact that anyone
making a search would be put on notice of an outstanding security
interest.'7 Where the evidence established that a misspelled name
misled a party, the filed security interest has been held invalid. 8
The court in In re Nara Non Food Distributing, Inc., 9 en-
dorsed a liberal interpretation of the filing requirements in the
Code:
The purpose of the adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code, insofar as this feature of it is concerned, was to eliminate
and avoid technical requirements and pitfalls and the court
should not by an illiberal construction, where no prejudice is
13. Id. at 554.
14. 3 UCC REP. SERV. 283 (D. Conn. 1965).
15. Opinion of the Attorney General of Maryland, 2 UCC REP. SERV. 108, 110 (1964).
16. 341 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1965).
17. See also In re Colorado Mercantile Co., 299 F. Supp. 55 (D. Colo. 1969) ("O.M.
Scott Credit Corp." instead of "O.M. Scott and Sons Co."); National Cash Register Co.
v. Firestone & Co., 346 Mass. 255, 191 N.E.2d 471 (1963) ("Cozy Kitchen" instead of
"Kozy Kitchen"); In re Nara Non Food Distrib., Inc., 66 Misc. 2d 779, 322 N.Y.S.2d 194
(Sup. Ct. 1970) ("Nara Dist., Inc." instead of "Nara Non Food Distributing, Inc.");
Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Kurland Cadillac-Oldsmobile, Inc., 57 Misc. 2d 806, 293 N.Y.S.2d
647 (Sup. Ct. 1968) ("Shiela" instead of "Sheila"); and Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
Terra Contractors Corp., 6 UCC REP. SERV. 544 (Civ. Ct., N.Y. County, 1969) ("Terra
Contractors, Inc." instead of "Terra Contractors Corporation").
18. John Deere Co. v. William C. Pahl Constr. Co., 59 Misc. 2d 872, 300 N.Y.S.2d
701 (Sup. Ct. 1969) ("Ranalli" was misspelled "Ranelli," however a number of security
interests with the correct spelling were in existence).
19. 66 Misc. 2d 779, 322 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
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shown, deprive the holder of a security interest of his property. 0
Those courts liberally construing section 9-402(1) hold that if the
quality of information contained in the financing statement is such
that it is reasonably possible for a subsequent creditor to locate the
secured party, the financing statement will not fail. Perhaps the
rule should be to disregard the formal defect in the financing state-
ment if no one has been misled, with the burden of proof thereof
on the party responsible for the defect.
In light of the factual context of Strauss was a strict construc-
tion of the Code requirements justified? The Burlington bank lent
money to Fleming, a farmer, and secured its loan with a standard
farm security agreement containing an after-acquired property
clause. Later, Strauss sold cattle to Fleming on conditional sales
notes, filed in lieu of a financing statement. Upon Fleming's de-
fault, Strauss took possession of the cattle, causing the bank to
bring an action in conversion against Strauss. The bank prevailed
in the lower court and Strauss appealed on the ground that the
property was repossessed by virtue of his superior security interest.
Although the conditional sales notes would have been effective
against Fleming,21 and Strauss' filing would have given his interest
priority over the bank's,2 2 the supreme court nevertheless struck
down the security interest because it deemed Strauss' address to
be insufficient. Although the notes were dated in Harvard, Illinois,
and the word "Harvard" appeared after Strauss' name, the court
held the address was not "sufficiently complete to enable a prudent
man using reasonable care to locate the secured party. '2 3
Had the bank been a subsequent creditor, a rigid interpretation
of section 9-402(1) might have been in order, but it need not have
been to the letter. The court in Silver stated: "The overall thrust
of Rooney and other cases in this area is to uphold validity if
sufficient information can reasonably be gleaned from the filing to
enable those desiring to reach the secured party to do So. ''24 The
filing of the conditional sales notes in Strauss fulfilled the basic
notice requirement of section 9-402, but was the address "Harvard,
Illinois," sufficient to enable a subsequent creditor to reach the
20. Id. at 780, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 194.
21. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-203(2).
22. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-312(4).
23. 50 Wis. 2d at 279, 184 N.W.2d at 126.
24. 432 F.2d at 993.
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secured party?2s The court determined that the address was insuffi-
cient because a nonlocal creditor would have difficulty locating
Strauss "unless Harvard, Illinois, is sufficiently small or Strauss
is sufficiently well known, two points not covered by the record. '26
Would the decision have been different had this information been
contained in the record? Since judicial notice is discretionary in
Wisconsin, the court may have been remiss in not taking notice
that Harvard, Illinois, is approximately eight miles south of the
Wisconsin border and twenty-eight miles from Burlington, has a
population of 5,019, and has only one Jules Strauss listed in the
phone book as of this writing. The court in Bengtson took notice
of the fact that there was only one Coca-Cola Bottling Company
in East Hartford or in the telephone directory of greater Hartford,
and, thus, deemed the information sufficientY
In resolving conflicting security interests, in the final analysis,
.it should be determined whether a party was misled by inadequate
or erroneous information. The court in Strauss, in its fastidious
attempt to protect subsequent creditors, ignored the fact that sub-
sequent creditors were not involved. Comment 1 of section 1-102
states: "The proper construction of the Act requires that its in-
terpretation and application be limited to its reason." The reason
for the filing requirement of section 9-402(1) is to protect subse-
quent creditors. Those requirements were used in Strauss, not for
the protection of subsequent creditors, but to defeat an otherwise
valid and good faith purchase money security interest.
WILLIAM C. NEIMANN
25. This writer pondered the various ways one could locate the secured party. Throwing
caution to the winds, a letter was addressed merely to Jules Strauss, Harvard, Illinois, and
duly dispatched with an 8 investment to help defray the postmaster's trouble. The chronol-
ogical sequence was as follows: 1) letter sent evening of day 1; 2) letter received by Strauss
morning of day 3; 3) reply sent by Strauss on day 4; 4) reply received by this writer on day
5. Total time elapsed was less than 96 hours, and all this without a zip code. One can
envision the return for a somewhat larger investment in a long distance telephone call (28¢
plus tax for three minutes Milwaukee to Harvard-figures courtesy of Betty, Wisconsin Bell
System).
26. 50 Wis. 2d at 278, 184 N.v.2d at 126.
27. 3 UCC RaP. SERV. at 287.
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